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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to introduce prospect theory in a game the-
oretic framework. We address the complexity of the weighting function
by restricting the object of our analysis to a 2-player 2-strategy game, in
order to derive some core results. We find that dominant and indifferent
strategies are preserved under prospect theory. However, in absence of
dominant strategies, equilibrium may not exist depending on parameters.
We also discuss a different approach presented by Metzger and Rieger
(2009) and give some interesting interpretations of the two approaches.
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1 Introduction
Expected utility theory (EUT), as axiomatised by Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944), has represented a crucial definition in game theory. Indeed, it is
a central model used both to shape rational choice in a normative way and to
describe economic behaviour. However, its underlying assumptions are far from
being harmless, especially when dealing with uncertainty and risk (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).
Moreover, scholars have been debating both on the validity of the expected
utility assumption, and on the likelihood of theoretical results derived under
this assumption (see, for instance, Starmer, 2000). Furthermore, experiments,
examples and paradoxes have been analysed, leading to results which are far
from those predicted by EUT.
In the field of risk and uncertainty several models have been developed as
alternative to EUT. Among these we find prospect theory (PT) and cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1992), rank dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982), and Choquet expected utility
(Schmeidler, 1986, 1989; Gilboa, 1987).
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2The main reason why these alternative models have been developed is the
observation of systematic violations of EUT axioms in economic behaviour (see
Camerer, 1995; Schoemaker, 1982; Starmer, 2000).
Perhaps, the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) is the most famous example of
these violations. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observe that there are system-
atic errors in agent’s choice, commonly known as ‘certainty effect’, ‘reflection
effect’, and ‘isolation effect’. People put a greater weight to payoffs which are
certain, while they “underweight outcomes that are merely probable” (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979). They find, furthermore, that positive outcomes are
evaluated differently from negative payoffs, and people are risk averse for pos-
itive values, and risk seeking when dealing with negative values (Markowitz,
1952; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Finally, the framework in which data are
presented to agents has a determinant effect on their final choice.
From these considerations they develop a theory of prospects1, which intro-
duces several new features. In particular, outcomes should be valued as relative
gains and/or losses with respect to a reference point and the marginal utility of
losses is bigger that that of gains. Furthermore, agents overweight almost cer-
tain events and underweight almost uncertain outcomes.These features account
for the three effects briefly presented above;
This paper aims at introducing prospect theory in games and defining a
preliminary approach of analysis. Although the relative great success of PT
and CPT in decision theory (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis et al.,
2001; Camerer, 2000; Jolls et al., 1998; McNeil et al., 1982; Quattrone and
Tversky, 1988), the consequences of introductioning CPT in game theory have
hardly been investigated.
To the best of our knowledge there is only one contribution on the topic
(Metzger and Rieger, 2009). They define a general framework and underline
the major issues in such analysis, and derive a general existence result.
If on the one hand so little has been written about prospect theory in games,
on the other it is possible to refer to part of the literature which analyses –
theoretically or by showing evidences – deviations from the expected utility
assumption2.
Crawford (1990) discusses the existence issue when the independence axiom
of von Neumann–Morgenstern is violated. Furthermore, he defines the concept
of equilibrium in beliefs and gives sufficient conditions for the existence of NE.
The same issue is analysed by Dekel et al. (1991) when preferences do not
satisfy the reduction of compound lottery assumption. They analyse two major
issues; the first is the existence of NE, which depends on players’ perception
of themselves as moving first or second. The second issue regards the dynamic
consistency of strategies.
Chen and Neilson (1999) analyse pure–strategy Nash Equilibruia when pref-
erences do not follow the expected utility assumption. They find that prefer-
ences should be quasi–convex in probabilities. They also find that continuity
1Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced PT in their seminal paper. They developed
a variant of PT, called CPT, where the weighting is applied to the cumulative probability
distribution function (cdf ), as in rank-dependent expected utility theory. In this paper we
refer to PT with regard to the basic insight of the model, while we refer to CPT for the
mathematical specification of the model.
2The reader could refer to Starmer (2000), who presents an outstanding review on the
literature on non–expected utility.
3and first order stochastic dominance is needed to assure the equilibrium in a
deterministic game.
Metzger and Rieger (2009) discuss the existence of NE within a PT frame-
work, as well as the divergence from EUT equilibrium predictions. They, how-
ever, focus on opponent’s strategy by assuming that players distort the prob-
ability of the opponent’s strategies, and do not consider the probability of the
single outcome. We will further discuss this approach in section 5.
A relevant question regards the opportunity of introducing prospect the-
ory in games. We think that PT can give important behavioural insights when
there is uncertainty about outcomes, which is neglected under EUT assumptions
(Starmer, 2000; Metzger and Rieger, 2009). Furthermore, since behavioural co-
efficients have been estimated and tested (see for instance, Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Wu and Gonzalez,
1996; Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2003),
they can be used to test whether or not empirical findings in experiments sup-
port this behavioural approach. Finally, prospect theory leads to several issues,
which we believe it is worth to analyse.
To have a comprehensive exposition, we would like to address the princi-
pal issues of introducing prospect theory in games. In particular, two major
problems regard the definition of payoffs as expressed in utility units, and the
definition of distorting probability function.
In the prospect theory framework, utility of a certain outcome depends on the
fact that it is a loss or a gain with respect to a certain reference point (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Metzger and Rieger (2009) notice that the transformation
of monetary outcome is nontrivial. This consideration arises even more if we
consider the choice of a reference point. We, however, do not consider this
problem and we assume, as in usual games, that outcomes are already expressed
in utility units. Furthermore, payoffs can always be transformed in utility units
after the choice of a reference point.
The second issue regards the distortion in players’ perception of probabilities,
due to the decision weighting function. This function “measures the impact of
events on the desirability of prospects, and not merely the perceived likelihood of
these events” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Since the probability function is
not linear and, moreover, it is not quasi-convex or quasi-concave in the whole
domain, the analytical problem becomes highly intractable.
We focus on the probability of an event – as the original idea of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) – while Metzger and Rieger (2009) distort the single prob-
ability of each opponent strategy. The different approach has implications both
on equilibrium existence and on complexity of the problem, which force us to
analyse only some specific games. Furthermore, there is a different equilibrium
interpretation of these two approaches, which is somehow linked to Crawford
(1990).
Therefore, we use a simple two-player and two-strategy framework. Fur-
thermore, we analyse the game using a specific weighting function, which ap-
proximates that proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). This because our
new function is more manageable analytically that the original function, while
it mantains the insights on the use of prospect theory functions. Conditions of
existence of a equilibrium are linked to concavity and convexity of the expected
utility function, and the insights can be extended to a more general cases.
The paper is structured as follows. In next section we will discuss some
4preliminaries and give some basic definitions. Then we will restrict our analysis
on a specific weighting probability function. In section 3 we will derive some
results about the existence of equilibria, which will be discussed in section 4.
Our approach is different from that used by (Metzger and Rieger, 2009), because
we focus on the probability of a certain outcome. In section 5 we will analyse the
differences between these two approaches, and the effect of these differences on
equilibrium existence results. Furthermore, we will link these approaches to two
well known concepts in literature which are Nash equilibrium and equilibrium
in beliefs (Crawford, 1990). Conclusions and remarks will follow. We find that
all the pure strategy Nash equilibria predicted from EUT are preserved under
our approach. Furthermore we find that the set of mixed equilibria could be
either empty or different from the one under EUT assumption.
2 Preliminaries
Before starting the analysis of our problem, we need to outline our setting. In
this paper we will analyse a two–player two–strategy game with simultaneous
moves.
The game consists of a set of players I = {R,C}, and two sets of actions for
the two players: AR = {R1,R2} and AC = {C1,C2}. Outcomes, expressed in
utility units3, are represented by the matrix shown in Table 1.
C1 C2
(q) (1 − q)
R1 (p) a1, b1 a4, b4
R2 (1 − p) a2, b2 a3, b3
Table 1: A canonical 2 × 2 game
We define the mixed-strategy spaces of R and C as follows:
∆(R) = {p ∶ AR → [0,1] ∣ p(R1) + p(R2) = 1} ≡ {(p,1 − p) ∣ p ∈ [0,1]} ,
∆(C) = {q ∶ AC → [0,1] ∣ q(C1) + q(C2) = 1} ≡ {(q,1 − q) ∣ q ∈ [0,1]} .
The mixed strategy space is ∆ =∆(R) ×∆(C). Furthermore, since each player
can choose only two possible actions, ∆(R) and ∆(C) can be identified with[0,1] and ∆ can be identified with [0,1]2.
The pure-strategy best response correspondence of R is BRR ∶ [0,1] → 2AR ,
where BRR(q) is the set of actions of player R which are best responses to the
mixed strategy q of C.
The mixed-strategy best response correspondence of R is ψR ∶ [0,1] → 2[0,1],
being ψR(q) the set of mixed strategies of R which are best responses to the
mixed strategy q of C. The same definitions hold for player C.
3We assume, without loss of generality, that payoffs are already expressed in utility units.
While this assumption is harmless in a expected utility framework, it should be careful con-
sidered in a prospect theory framework. We will further discuss this point later on this paper,
after outlining the characteristics of PT.
5Finally, we define the correspondence ψ ∶ [0,1]2 → 2[0,1]2 where ψ(p, q) =
ψR(q) × ψC(p). We recall that a NE is a mixed strategy profile (p, q) ∈ [0,1]2
in which each player’s strategy is optimal for him, given the opponent strategy.
Formally, if (p, q) ∈ [0,1]2 is a Nash equilibrium, then p ∈ ψR(q) and q ∈ ψC(p)
i.e. (p, q) ∈ ψ(p, q) is a fixed point of the correspondence ψ. The logic is
reversible, so (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a fixed point of the
correspondence ψ.
2.1 Utility function
In an expected utility framework, given a generic mixed strategy profile, the
utility of player R can be expressed as in expression(1).
U0R (p, q) = a4p(1 − q) + a3(1 − p)(1 − q) + a2q(1 − p) + a1pq. (1)
In order to specify the utility function under CPT assumptions, we must
analyse the ranking among outcomes. Suppose, for instance, that payoffs ai
satisfy the following ranking: a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4 ≥ 0. We assume that outcomes
are already expressed in utility units. However, given the initial payoffs, an
S-shaped value function – such that proposed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
– and a reference point, we can always express original payoffs in utility units.
Using CPT the utility associated, for player R, to a generic mixed strategy
profile (p, q) is:
UR (p, q) = a4 + (a3 − a4)pi (1 − p + pq) + (a2 − a3)pi(q) + (a1 − a2)pi(pq). (2)
where pi ∶ [0; 1] → [0; 1] is a weighting function, i.e. a function which mono-
tonically distorts the probabilities. Trivially, when pi(x) = x, we do not distort
the probabilities. and (1) is the same of (2).Therefore, EUT is a special case of
CPT.
2.2 Distorted probabilities
The idea of a weighting function for probabilities was formalized for the first
time by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). It is a strictly increasing function
pi ∶ [0; 1]→ [0; 1] satisfying the conditions pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = 1. The weighting
function proposed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is:
pi(p) = pγ[pγ + (1 − p)γ] 1γ . (3)
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated γ = 0.61 for probabilities attached
to gains and γ = 0.69 for those attached to losses. Figure 1 shows the typical
graph of expression (3). The inverse S-shape corresponds to the fact that people
overweight very small probabilities and underweight average and large ones.
The complexity of this function determines some difficulties in the study of
the sign of the derivative of the utility function4. Indeed there is not a closed
4The derivative of (3) with respect to p is
pi′(p) =
(γ − 1)p2γ−1 + (p − p2)γ−1(p − pγ + γ)
[pγ + (1 − p)γ]
1
γ
+1
. (4)
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Figure 1: CPT weighting function
form solution for the roots of its first derivative. To overcome this issue, we can
specify a simpler version of the weighting function 3.
The reason to proceed in this way is simple. Our aim is to explore the be-
havioural effects of introducing CPT in games, and analyse how this affects NE
existence. Therefore, we can use a more manageable function which approxi-
mates the original one (Expressed in 3). This approach gives us some results
and insights on the effects on equilibria of CPT assumptions, which could ex-
plain the differences between outcomes predicted by the theory and outcomes
observed in reality.
2.3 A simple weighting function
The complexity of the probability weighting function (expression 3) leads to a
major issue: it is not possible to derive a closed form solution for the maximi-
sation problem. Therefore, we cannot give conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium in the game.
However, we can define the following weighting function:
ω(p) = { √αp 0 ≤ p ≤ α
1 −
√(1 − α)(1 − p) α ≤ p ≤ 1 . (6)
for α ∈ (0,1), which is differentiable in (0,1).
This function approximates the original Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
Given a certain value of the parameter γ (for expression 3) we can find the
parameter α which approximates this function. Moreover, our function has α as
fixed point (i.e. ω(α) = α), while for the KT weighting function with γ = .61, the
fixed point is p ≈ 1/3. Therefore, we can always find the parameter α which can
approximate the function. In figure 2 we plot expression (6) with α = 1/3 and
expression (3) with γ = .61. As we can see, ω(p) seems to nicely approximate
pi(p), provided that their fixed points are coincident.
The derivative of the utility function UR (p, q) with respect to p is
∂UR (p, q)
∂p
= (a3 − a4)pi
′(1 − p + pq)(q − 1) + (a1 − a2)pi
′(pq)q. (5)
7The aim of this paper is to investigate how the use of PT affects the equi-
librium in a game. Since payoffs are expressed in utility units, the focus on
the behavioural effect of distorted probability. Given that expression (3) is the
most popular weighting function used in literature and given that expression
(6) approximates nicely the original function, we beleive that our approach will
preserve insights on the use of CPT in games.
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3 Nash Equilibria, best responses and CPT
In this section we will analyse some core results of applying CPT to a generic
2-player 2-strategy game, which can be represented in table 1.
In general we can express the problem as follows: given the sets of best
responses for the two players GψR = {(p, q) ∣ q ∈ [0,1], p ∈ ψR(q)} and GψC ={(p, q) ∣ p ∈ [0,1], q ∈ ψC(p)}. The intersection of GψR and GψC determines the
set of NE. We can use this notation both under EUT and CPT.
The first case to be investigated is the presence either i) of a dominant
strategy or ii) of two indifferent strategies. In our setting – i.e. a 2–player 2–
strategy game – we have at least one pure NE. In the most extreme case, when
each player is inifferent between his two strategies, every combination (p, q) is
a NE for p, q ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 1. Dominant Strategies. Dominant or indifferent strategies
always emerge under Cumulative Prospect Theory, regardless to the weighting
function used.
Proof. See Appendix 6
Our first result is that dominant strategies are preserved using CPT pref-
erences. This result applies regardless to the type of weighting function used.
Therefore, since EUT is a special case of CPT, the set of pure NE using EUT
must coincide with the set of pure NE under CPT.
Corollary 2. When both players have a (strictly or weakly) dominant strategy,
or two indifferent strategies, the set of pure Nash equilibria is the same both
under EUT and CPT.
Dominant strategies always emerge as optimal strategies also under CPT.
The explanation is simple, whatever is the opponent’s move, the player has
8always a unique best response (or is indifferent between the two strategies).
Thus, also using a structure of preferences which satisfies CPT, the best response
set remains the same.
On the contrary, CPT may affects best responses when there is not a dom-
inant strategy. We will analyse the special case in which payoff are such that:
a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4 ≥ 0, in order to provide an example of non existence of
equilibria. This is a direct result of the form of the weighting function and,
consequently, of the utility function.
Proposition 3. Absence of dominant strategies. Using the weighting func-
tion defined in Expression (6), and a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4 ≥ 0, mixed equilibria may
not exist under CPT. When it exists, it can be shifted with respect to the EUT
case.
Proposition 4. Using the weighting function defined in Expression (6), and
a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4 ≥ 0, defining A =
a1−a2
a3−a4
, the condition A ≥ 1−α
α
is sufficient for
the continuity of the best response correspondence of player R.
Proof. See Appendix 6
Corollary 5. When Proposition 4 holds for both players, there will always exist
at least one equilibrium. Thus this is a sufficient conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium.
.
Introducing CPT in our framework has a dramatic effect. For certain values
of the parameters – such that A < 1−α
α
– players find not optimal to mix between
their two pure strategies. Consequently, mixed equilibrium could not exist under
CPT. This is the result of non–continuity of the best response function. On the
other hand, when A ≥ 1−α
α
, the optimal (mixed) strategy profile for each player
may be different with respect to the EUT case. When the equality holds the
best response sets using the two approaches are the same (see Figure 5).
Moreover, when pure NE do not exist in the game, the above condition is a
necessary condition for the existence of a mixed equilibrium.
Figure 3 and 4 show the reaction curves using the two approaches (CPT and
EUT). In our example, it is easy to see that with CPT preferences, player R is
willing to mix between his strategies although it would not be optimal under
EUT.
It is straightforward to see that if A = 1−α
α
the reaction curves perfectly
coincide (Figure 5).
Consequently, even if a mixed equilibrium exist it could be different when
assuming CPT; behavioural and experimental evidences may be explained by
this assumption.
4 Results and comments
The above results can be summarised as follows. Pure Nash Equilibria, which
are the result of the presence of dominant strategies or indifferent strategies,
are equilibria also under Cumulative Prospect Theory. The latter approach,
however, may affect the wider set of mixed equilibria.
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Figure 3: Reaction curves with CPT and EUT with a1 = 6, a2 = 3, a3 = 2, a4 = 1,
α = 1/3
This is a direct result of the special form assumed by the weighting function
and, consequently, by players’ preferences. Indeed, we can explain this result
under a more general framework.
The existence of a mixed equilibrium is subject to the condition that players
will find optimal to mix between their available strategies. However, “non-
expected utility maximizing players whose preferences cannot be represented by
functions that are everywhere quasiconcave in the probabilities’ may be unwilling
to randomize as equilibrium would require” (Crawford, 1990).
Continuity of reaction functions is a sufficient condition for the existence of a
mixed equilibrium, Therefore. when Proposition 4 holds for both players there
will always exist at least one equilibrium in the game. Given the structure of
payoffs, the conditions imposed are based on the value of payoffs (i.e. the value
of A), and on the fixed point of the weighting function (α).
A characteristic of the CPT weighting function is that they are concave in a
certain initial interval of probabilities – in our case between 0 and α – and then
they are convex after the fixed point (see Figure 2).
First of all, we should notice that the expected utility under CPT (Expression
n. 2) in the special case a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4 ≥ 0, results in a linear combination
of the probability weighting functions. Consequently, the form of the expected
utility is a direct result of the form of the weighting function, since it is the
linear combination of the weighting functions.
Therefore, we can address our result in a more general framework, in which
the concavity – linearity, or convexity – of preferences affects the existence of
mixed equilibria.
Secondly, the condition expressed in the proposition 4 may be interpreted
as conditions for quasi–concavity or quasi–convexity, as we will see below.
Using EUT, R will be indifferent between R1 and R2 – and will be willing
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Figure 4: Reaction curves with CPT and EUT with a1 = 18, a2 = 8, a3 = 6,
a4 = 5, α = 1/3
to mix between these two strategies – if the following condition is met:
a1q + a4(1 − q)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
R1
= a2q + a3(1 − q)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
R2
⇐⇒ A =
a1 − a2
a3 − a4
=
1 − q
q
(7)
Consequently,if A > 1−q
q
, he strictly prefersR1, and he prefersR2 on the contrary.
Therefore, we can define q∗ as the probability q which makes indifferent R,
i.e. q∗ = 1
1+A
. For smaller values of q, strategy R1 is strictly preferred to R2,
and vice versa.
We find that a sufficient condition, under our special assumptions, for the
existence of a mixed equilibrium is that α ≥ 1
1+A
. Thus, we need the fixed point
of the weighting function to be greater or equal to the indifference probability
using EUT, i.e. α ≥ q∗. This condition has a real neat graphic explanation (See
Figure 6): the indifference point under EUT must lay in the quasi–concave part
of the weighting function. When a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4, the condition for concavity
of the weighting function are the same of the second order condition of the
expected utility function.
This interpretation has three major consequences. On the one hand, we can
link conditions for the equilibrium existence in a more general framework, which
is the generic class of quasi–concave or quasi–convex preferences. Secondly, our
results may be broaden considering other cases different from a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4 ≥
0, now by looking at the whole expected utility function. Finally, we can use
our insights for all types of weighting function, such as the original proposed by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) or that proposed by Prelec (1998).
For general cases, different from a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4 ≥ 0, concavity is not deter-
mined by the condition α > 1
1+A
. Although for the other cases it is difficult, if
not impossible, to derive a closed form condition for concavity, we can look at
11
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Figure 5: Reaction curves with CPT and EUT with a1 = 5, a2 = 3, a3 = 2, a4 = 1,
α = 1/3
concavity/convexity of the expected utility function using numerical simulations
(see for instance Figure 6).
5 An alternative approach
In the previous pages we mentioned that an alternative approach has been
analysed by Metzger and Rieger (2009). In this section we will briefly explain
the differences in the two papers, and the effect on the equilibrium properties
of the models. Furthermore, we think that a very neat interpretation could be
given to the two approaches.
In our paper we focus on the probability of a certain outcome, which is the
result of two (mixed) strategies. This means that the probability of the event
is distorted by players. By using this approach we follow the original idea of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), according to which “decision weights measure
the impact of events on the desirability of prospects”.
On the other hand, Metzger and Rieger (2009)5 apply the following two step
approach: first each player subjectively weights the probabilities (strategies) of
her opponents, according to CPT; then she calculates her expectation, according
to EUT.
This intermediate approach between CPT and EUT, is compatible with the
Kakutani fixed point theorem (Kakutani, 1941; Nash, 1950, 1951) and, sub-
stantially, it leads to a possible shift of the equilibrium points in the Nash Set.
Thus the two authors find that a Nash equilibrium always exists in the game
5For sake of exposition clarity, in the following lines, we will refer to this approach as
alternative or intermediate approach
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Figure 6: CPT weighting function, and EUT indifference point
analysed.
In our opinion it is not possible to say what approach is preferable, since the
two methods focus either on the probability of a single event which generates a
certain utility, or on the probability of an opponent following a certain strategy.
We, however, find some analogies to Crawford (1990).
In particular, we think that the alternative approach is linked to the def-
inition of equilibrium in beliefs as defined by Crawford (1990), which requires
“each player’s beliefs about the other’s mixed strategy to be a (possibly degener-
ate) probability distribution over the other’s best replies”.
This because Metzger and Rieger (2009) structure their analysis as follows.
Given the probability distribution over the strategies of the opponent(s), the
player would prefer a certain pure strategy. Then, he will mix among the pure
strategies to maximise his payoff. Straigthforwadly, it is easy to see that this
approach is compatible to Crawford (1990)6.
We, however, need to do some remarks about this point. First of all, Craw-
ford (1990) analyses the effect of applying a structure of preferences on monetary
payoffs with mixed strategies. We, instead, refer to the way in which weight-
ing functions are used in intermediate approach. Insights, however, remain the
same, as well as for the interpretation of equilibrium.
Furthermore, our approach leads to some analytical difficulties which are not
found in Metzger and Rieger (2009). Therefore, if on the one hand our approach
is more consistent with the definition of Nash equilibrium, on the other hand,
technical difficulties lead to less general results. Equilibrium always exist in
Metzger and Rieger (2009), which is not our case. On the other hand, since we
can consider the intermediate approach as an equilibrium in beliefs, we should
6In particular, we may think that this approach is a special case of Crawford (1990), when
the structure of preferences has a sort of separability of the utility from monetary payoffs and
the utility from the probability that a certain strategy is chosen by opponents.
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notice that “the predictive content of an equilibrium is small: it predicts only
that each player uses an action that is a best response to the equilibrium beliefs”
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).
6 Conclusions
We investigated how the use of CPT affect a 2x2 non-cooperative game. The
first result was that all the pure strategy Nash equilibria predicted in the EUT
framework are preserved. We however find that the set of mixed equilibria could
be either empty or different from the one under EUT assumption. In only one
case the two approaches lead to the same set of equilibria.
Due to analytical difficulties we are able to study only a case where payoffs
have some restrictions. However, we can interpret the conditions for existence
of NE as conditions for quasi-concavity of the expected utility function. In this
way we can generalise to all form of weighting functions and to a more general
structure of payoffs, so to make wider, and more consistent to the previous
literature, our results.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In our setting (Table 1) pure NE arise when both players either have a dominant
strategy or are indifferent between their strategies. Therefore we need to prove
that using CPT these strategies remain best response for a generic player. We
will consider three cases: (1) R [C] has a strictly dominant strategy, for instance
R1 [C1]; (2) R [C] has a weakly dominant strategy; and (3) the two strategies
R1 [C1] and R2 [C2] are indifferent. We will consider only one player, since the
same logic applies for both players.
Let’s consider the last and simplest case. Indifference between the two strate-
gies arises when each strategy leads to the same payoffs, i.e. a1 = a2 ≥ a3 = a4.
In this case, R′s expectation using CPT is
UR (p, q) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
a3 + (a1 − a3)pi+(q) a1 ≥ a3 ≥ 0
a1pi+(q) + a3pi−(1 − q) a1 > 0 > a3
a1 + (a3 − a1)pi−(1 − q) 0 ≥ a1 ≥ a3 . (8)
While R′s expectation using EUT is:
U0R(p, q) = a1q + a3(1 − q). (9)
Note that Expressions (8) and (9) are independent of p. Therefore, the set of
best responses, both under EUT and CPT, is ψR(q) = [0,1] ∀q ∈ [0,1].
Now suppose that R1 weakly dominates R2. Without loss of generality we
assume that a1 > a2 ≥ a3 = a4 (Table 1).
Player R′s expectation using CPT is
UR (p, q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a3 + (a2 − a3)pi+(q) + (a1 − a2)pi+(pq) a1 > a2 ≥ a3 ≥ 0
a3pi−(1 − q) + a2pi+(q) + (a1 − a2)pi+(pq) a1 > a2 ≥ 0 > a3
a2pi−(1 − pq) + (a3 − a2)pi−(q) + a1pi + (pq) a1 ≥ 0 > a2 ≥ a3
a1 + (a2 − a1)pi−(1 − pq) + (a3 − a2)pi−(1 − q) 0 > a1 > a2 ≥ a3 .
(10)
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R′s expectation using EUT is showed as follows:
U0R(p, q) = a3 + (a2 − a3)q + (a1 − a2)pq. (11)
Equations (10) and (11) show that expectation of R is independent on p when
q = 0 and then ψR(0) = [0,1]. For q ≠ 0 Since (1) pq and pi+(pq) are increasing
in p, and (2) pi−(1 − qp) is decreasing in p, the expected utility is maximized
choosing p = 1 for all q ≠ 0 , i.e ψR(q) = {1} ∀q ∈]0,1]. As in the previous case,
the best response set is equal under EUT and CPT.
Finally, assume R1 strictly dominates R2, i.e. a1 ≥ a4 > a3 ≥ a2. In this case,
using EUT as well as using CPT, expected utility is maximized by p = 1 for all
q, i.e ψR(q) = {1} ∀q ∈ [0,1].
Proof of proposition 3
Since a1 > a2 ≥ a3 > a4, consequently, R’s expected utility for a generic strategy
profile (p, q) is:
UR (p, q) = a4 + (a3 − a4)pi (1 − p + pq) + (a2 − a3)pi(q) + (a1 − a2)pi(pq), (12)
whose derivative with respect to p is
∂UR (p, q)
∂p
= (a3 − a4)pi′(1 − p + pq)(q − 1) + (a1 − a2)pi′(pq)q. (13)
We can study the sign of this derivative, which is
∂UR (p, q)
∂p
> [<;=]0 ⇔ A = a1 − a2
a3 − a4
> [<;=] 1 − q
q
⋅
pi′(pq + 1 − p)
pi′(pq) . (14)
Note that we are using the weighting function defined in Expression (6), whose
derivative is:
ω′(p) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2
√
α
p
0 < p ≤ α
1
2
√
(1−α)
(1−p)
α ≤ p < 1
. (15)
Since pq + 1 − p ≥ pq, and using Expression (15), we can distinguish three cases:
1. In the first case we have
α ≥ pq + 1 − p ≥ pq ⇔ p ≥
1 − α
1 − q
,
and Expression (14) becomes:
A >
1 − q
q
√
pq
pq + 1 − p
⇔ p <
A2q(1 − q)(1 − q +A2q) = C(q). (16)
2. The second instance arises if
pq + 1 − p ≥ pq ≥ α ⇔ p ≥
α
q
,
then Expression (14) becomes:
A >
1 − q
q
√
1 − pq
p − pq
⇔ p >
1 − q
q(1 − q +A2q) =D(q). (17)
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Figure 7: R best response correspondence when A < 1−α
α
.
3. Finally, if
pq + 1 − p > α > pq ⇔ p <min{α
q
,
1 − α
1 − q
} ,
expression (14) becomes:
A >
√
1 − α
α
1 − q
q
⇔ q >
1 − α(1 − α +A2α) = B. (18)
Note that in expressions (16), (17) and (18) we have defined the quantities
C(q) and D(q) (depending on q) and B (not depending on q).
Under our hypotheses, we have only two parameters. These are two between
A, α and B. Thus we discuss the general case, distinguishing the following three
cases.
Case I A <
1 − α
α
⇔ α <
1
1 +A
⇔ B > α,
Case II A >
1 − α
α
⇔ α >
1
1 +A
⇔ B < α,
Case III A =
1 − α
α
⇔ α =
1
1 +A
⇔ B = α.
Case I, A < 1−α
α
. Player C chooses his strategy in the interval [0,1], which
can be partitioned by:
0 < α <
1
1 +A
< B < 1.
If 0 ≤ q ≤ α, then pq ≤ q ≤ α. If pq + 1 − p ≥ α, i.e. p ∈ [0,1 − α/1 − q], thus
U ′ < 0 iff A <
√
1−α
α
1−q
q
i.e. iff q < B which is true being q ≤ α < B.
If p ∈]1 − α/1 − q,1], thus U ′ < 0 iff p > C(q), that is true if C(q) ≤ 1 − α/1 − q
which is equivalent to q < B, that is true. Thus if 0 ≤ q ≤ α, then U ′(p) < 0 for
all p ∈ [0,1].
If 1 ≥ q > B > α, thus pq + 1 − p > α. If pq ≤ α, i.e. p ∈ [0, α/q] then U ′ > 0 iff
A >
√
1−α
α
1−q
q
, i.e. iff q > B that is true. If p ∈]α/q,1], U ′ > 0 iff p > D(q), that
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Figure 8: R best response correspondence
is true if α/q ≥ D(q) i.e. q > B that is true. Thus if 1 ≥ q > B > α, U ′(p) > 0 for
all p ∈ [0,1].
If α < q < B, then pq + 1 − p > α. If pq ≤ α, i.e. p ∈ [0, α/q] then U ′ < 0 iff
A <
√
1−α
α
1−q
q
i.e. iff q < B that is true. If p ∈]α/q,1], U ′ < 0 iff p < D(q). The
position of D(q) in the interval [0,1] depends on the confront of q and 1/(1+A).
If q ∈]α,1/(1 +A)] then D(q) ≥ 1 and so p < D(q) is true, i.e U ′(p) < 0 for all
p ∈ [0,1]. If q ∈]1/(1 + A)/B[ then U ′(p) < 0 if p < D(q) and U ′(p) > 0 if
p >D(q).
In Case I, we conclude in any case that for all q ∈ [0,1], ψp(q) ⊆ {0,1}. Now
the question regards the confront between U(0) and U(1). Since U(0) > U(1)
when q < pi−1 ( 1
1+A
) = A, then the graph of ψq(p) is that showed in figure 8,
where q1/2 = A. Let us note how this is the case where equilibria could not
exist.
Case II, A > 1−α
α
. In this case the interval [0,1] can be partitioned by
0 < B <
1
1 +A
< α < 1.
If 0 ≤ q ≤ B < α, then pq ≤ q < α. If pq + 1− p ≥ α, i.e. p ∈ [0,1−α/1− q], thus
U ′ ≤ 0 iff A ≥
√
1−α
α
1−q
q
i.e. iff q ≤ B which is true.
If p ∈]1 − α/1 − q,1], thus U ′ ≤ 0 iff p ≥ C(q), that is true if C(q) ≤ 1 − α/1 − q
which is equivalent to q ≤ B, that is true. Thus if 0 ≤ q ≤ B < α, then U ′(p) ≤ 0
for all p ∈ [0,1].
If α ≤ q ≤ 1, thus pq + 1 − p ≥ α. If pq ≤ α, i.e. p ∈ [0, α/q] then U ′ ≥ 0 iff
A ≥
√
1−α
α
1−q
q
, i.e. iff q ≥ B that is true. If p ∈]α/q,1], U ′ ≥ 0 iff p > D(q), that
is true if α/q ≥D(q) i.e. q ≥ B that is true. Thus if α ≤ q ≤ 1, then U ′(p) ≥ 0 for
all p ∈ [0,1].
If B ≤ q ≤ α, then pq ≤ q ≤ α. If pq + 1 − p ≥ α, i.e. p ∈ [0,1 − α/1 − q], thus
U ′ ≥ 0 iff A ≥
√
1−α
α
1−q
q
i.e. iff q ≥ B which is true.
If p ∈]1−α/1− q,1], thus U ′ ≥ 0 iff p ≤ C(q). Regarding the positioning of C(q),
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we have that
1 − α
1 − q
≤
↑
q≥B
C(q) ≤
↑
q≤ 1
1+A
1
Thus, if q ∈ [1/1 +A,α], C ≥ 1 ≥ p and then U ′(p) ≥ 0. At this point, regarding
the sign of the derivative U ′(p) we have the following result. If q ∈ [0,B] then
U ′(p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ [0,1] and if q ∈ [1/(1+A),1] then U ′(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0,1].
If B < q ≤ 1
1+A
, thus the sign of the derivative U ′(p) changing p is the
following: If p ∈ [0,C(q)[ then U ′(p) > 0, while if p ∈]C(q),1] then U ′(p) < 0.
Being U(p) continuous in C(q) this means that in this case the best response
correspondence of R is just ψR(q) = {C}. The quantity C = A2q(1−q)(1−q+A2q) is
increasing in q, since C ′(q) ≥ 0. Thus, when q moves from B to 1/(1+A), C(q)
increases from C(B) = 1/C(α) to C(1/1 +A) = 1.
Finally the graph of ψR(q) is that showed in figure 8. We have just to justify
the shape of ψR(B) = [0,C(B)].
If q = B < α, then
1 − α
1 − q
= C(B) = 1
C(α) .
If p ∈ [0,C(B)] then
U ′(p) = A − 1 −B
B
√
1 − α
α
B
1 −B
= a −A = 0.
If p ∈]C(B),1],
U ′(p) = A −√ pB
pB + 1 − p
,
that is negative if p > [C(α)]−1 = C(B). From the sign of U ′(p) we elicit that,
for q = B, U(p) is constant if p ∈ [0,C(B)] and decreasing if p ∈]C(B),1]. Thus
ψR(B) = [0,C(B)].
Let us note that in this Case II we have the continuity of the best response
correspondence of player R. This condition, together with the continuity of
the best response of the other player ensures the existence of an equilibrium.
However this equilibrium could be shifted with respect to prediction of EUT.
Case III, A = 1−α
α
. This hypothesis is equivalent to say that (a1 − a2)α =(a3 − a4) (1 − α). Note that 1/(1+A) = α and pi−1 (1/1 +A) = pi−1 (α) = α. Since
αp ≤ α and αp + 1 − p ≥ α, thus the utility
UR (p,α) = a4 + (a3 − a4)+ (a2 − a3)pi (α)+√p [α (a1 − a2) − (1 − α) (a3 − a4)] =
= a4 + (a3 − a4) + (a2 − a3)pi (α)
does not depend on p and then, ψR(α) = [0,1]. Finally the graph of ψR(q) is
showed in figure 9, with q0 = α. Thus, in Case III, CPT prediction coincides
with EUT prediction.
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Figure 9:
